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COMMENTS
DEFENSIVELY PLEADING COMMERCIAL
LANDLORDS' BREACHES IN SUMMARY
ACTIONS FOR POSSESSION: A
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROPOSAL
Reforms in landlord-tenant law may generally be traced to a dynamic ten-
sion between principles of equity and fairness and expedient, judicially su-
pervised recovery of property. Harsh results demanded by traditional
doctrines have driven statutory and judicial reforms in the tenant's favor,
but pressure to maintain swift and uncomplicated eviction procedures to
promote the continuing productive use of real property remains steady.' In
addition, general movements in civil procedure and a huge volume of mod-
em, urban landlord-tenant cases have made considerations of judicial econ-
omy an influential factor.2 The development of landlord-tenant procedure in
the District of Columbia provides a compelling example of interaction
among these forces.
Since the late 1960's, the District of Columbia has served as a crucible for
reforms benefitting the residential tenant. However, the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals has compensated for expansion of residential tenants'
substantive and procedural protections by denying these same benefits to
commercial tenants, primarily to ensure swift and simple recovery of prop-
erty for the landlord.3 Courts administer substantive reform through the
instrument of landlord-tenant procedure. Procedural "adjustments" often
follow perceptions that the substantive balance may have tipped too far in
favor of either the landlord or the tenant.
This Comment will focus on the development of defensive pleading in the
District of Columbia in the context of a landlord's suit for possession for
nonpayment of rent. Specifically, this Comment will explore the extent to
which the tenant may defend on the basis of breaches of express lease cove-
nants by the landlord. It will survey the history of defensive landlord-tenant
1. See Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414
F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
2. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS 43 (1986) (The court
disposed of 87,926 landlord-tenant cases in 1986.).
3. See infra note 115-16 and accompanying text.
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pleading in the District of Columbia, and examine the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals' shift to a narrow reading of tenant's rights to plead
breaches by the landlord in defense to a possessory action. It will then note
certain disparities between two classes of tenant, residential and commercial,
produced by this restrictive construction. Finally, the Comment will criti-
cally analyze the underlying rationale for excluding commercial tenants' de-
fenses based on the landlord's breach in a suit for nonpayment of rent and
propose that the commercial tenant be permitted to plead material breaches
of the lease by the landlord in defense to a suit for possession for nonpay-
ment of rent.
I. EARLY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LANDLORD-TENANT ACTIONS:
DEVELOPMENT OF LANDLORDS' REMEDIES AND
TENANTS' RELIEF
A. Early Sources of Law
In 1801, Congress adopted the common and statutory law of Maryland, as
it then existed, as the law of property in the nascent District of Columbia.4
English statutes and decisions controlled in Maryland, an original colony.'
Thus, the English feudal tradition, which favored the landlord, governed
early landlord-tenant relations in the District of Columbia.6
The doctrine of independent covenants prominently figured in the tradi-
tional system, affecting both substantive and procedural rights of parties to a
lease. As the term for years developed, the courts came to view the transac-
tion as primarily a conveyance of an interest in real property in exchange for
rent, which relegated any contractual covenants to secondary status. Thus,
the preferred contractual construction of covenants as mutually dependent,
such that one party's failure to perform generally relieved the other from
contractual obligations, did not apply.7 Therefore, breaches of covenant by
4. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103; see also J. KARPOFF, LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT LAW IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 11 (1977).
5. See generally W. ABERT & B. LovEjoy, THE COMPILED STATUTES IN FORCE IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ch. 38, at 314-36 (1894) (indicating English statutes in force in early
District of Columbia landlord-tenant law, and Maryland and District of Columbia cases de-
cided thereunder); J. ALEXANDER, BRITISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND (2d ed.
1912) (fully annotated three volume set of statutes dating from time of the Magna Carta)
[hereinafter ALEXANDER'S BRITISH STATUTES].
6. English statutes incorporated into early District of Columbia law facilitated recovery
of rents and prevented tenant fraud and, in effect, perpetuated the despotic, feudal origin of the
landlord-tenant relationship. See, e.g., 11 Geo., 2 ch. 19 (1738), reprinted in W. ABERT & B.
LovEJoY supra note 5, at 329-35; 4 Geo., 2, ch. 28 (1731), reprinted in W. ABERT & B.
LovrjoY supra note 5, at 326.
7. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 70 (1985). The
doctrine of independent covenants is a product of an antiquated perspective of the nature of
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the landlord did not excuse the tenant's partial or total default in rent.8
From a theoretical property law standpoint, a corresponding burden fell
upon the landlord. Once the landlord made the conveyance, he had no pos-
sessory rights in the premises despite any lapse in the tenant's obligations.9
Landlords, however, invariably reserved an express right to reenter, making
any technical reciprocity academic.1 ° This lease provision secured the land-
lord's right of self-help, the most potent common law remedy for nonpay-
ment of rent. The landlord who had reserved this right could forcibly oust
the defaulting tenant," or seize his chattels as security for payment of rent.' 2
the lease transaction. In the early history of the term for years, the essence of the bargain was
the right to cultivate and derive produce from the land in exchange for money rent. Because
rent "issued from the land," any structures which happened to be on the premises were inci-
dental to the essential exchange. The principal duty of the landlord was to ensure undisturbed
possession by the tenant, and breaches of other lease covenants did not affect the tenant's duty
to pay rent. See 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 686, at 240 (3d ed. 1960); 2 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 221.1, at 178-79 (P. Rohan comp. 1986); Note, Commercial
Leases: Behind the Green Door, 12 PAC. L.J. 1067, 1075 (1981).
8. See Pinching v. Wurdeman, 12 F.2d 164, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1926). The equally harsh
concomitant doctrine of caveat lessee, which still applies in commercial leases, has its roots in
this view of leasehold tenure. The law imputed a duty to inspect premises for suitability upon
the tenant, whose "eyes were his bargain." See Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d
438, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1933); see also Hughes v. Westchester Dev. Corp., 77 F.2d 550, 551 (D.C.
Cir. 1935).
9. See generally C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 70; Greenfield & Margolies, An Implied
Warranty of Fitness in Non-Residential Leases, 45 ALB. L. REV. 855, 861 (1981); Hicks, The
Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 454 (1972).
10. Gerwin, A Study of the Evolution and Potential of Landlord-Tenant Law and Judicial
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the District of Columbia-Part II: A Critical Examination
and Proposal for Reform, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 641, 642-43 & n.6 (1977) [hereinafter Gerwin
II]; Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 9, at 861.
11. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71-72 (1972); Burford v. Krause, 89 F. Supp.
818, 819 (D.D.C. 1950); Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d 781, 783 (D.C. 1978) (en banc); see also
Adams v. Horr, 6 D.C. (1 Mackey) 45, 46 (1864).
12. This was known as distress. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 334 (1895); Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relationship in Perspective: From Sta-
tus to Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9 KAN. L. REV. 369, 371 (1961); see also Tutt v. Doby,
459 F.2d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1972); C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 70 n.3; Gerwin II, supra
note 10, at 642 n.5.
Several English distress statutes were part of the law of the District. See, e.g., 11 Geo. 2, ch.
19 (1738), reprinted in 2 ALEXANDER'S BRITISH STATUTES, supra note 5, at 981; 2 W. & M.,
ch. 5, § 3 (1690), reprinted in W. ABERT & B. LovEJoy, supra note 5, at 324; 11 Geo. 2, ch.
19, §§ 7-8 (1738), reprinted in W. ABERT & B. LOvEjOy, supra note 5, at 330.
In 1867, Congress supplanted the right of judicially unsupervised distress in the District
with a statute allowing the landlord to establish a lien on the nonpaying tenant's personal
property which could be enforced in the courts. Act of Feb. 22, 1867, ch. 64, § 12, 14 Stat. 403
(codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1413 (1981)).
Self-help was expedient and economical, but led to violence and bloodshed. See Lindsey,
405 U.S. at 71-72. Despite the availability of judicial remedies, self-help, a vestige of a harsh
medieval world where force was equated with justice, was remarkably tenacious in the Dis-
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For centuries, maligned tenants struggled for recognition of property
rights in the leased premises in the form of a possessory action for wrongful
ouster.' 3 By the seventeenth century, courts acknowledged that a wrong-
fully ousted tenant could bring an action in ejectment for possession of the
premises. This formed the genesis of a recognition of the lease as a convey-
ance of an estate in land.14
It is a recurring irony of landlord-tenant law that landlords often appro-
priated, to their own purposes, tenants' common-law remedies originally de-
veloped to redress and prevent abuses of self-help. 5 Because the tenant's
new possessory remedy had much to recommend it over older real actions,
landlords enjoyed its benefits as a means to try disputed title, entering ficti-
tious leases under assumed names to invoke standing as lessees. 6 In light of
this tortured application, it is not surprising that landlords eventually used
ejectment, originally a defensive remedy to establish the tenant's right to
possession, as their chief means of recovering leased premises with the aid of
judicial process. 7 Limitations on rights of self-help developed as the law of
landlord-tenant emerged from its feudal origins, leading landlords to resort
trict. See Simpson v. Lee, 499 A.2d 889, 896 (D.C. 1985); Mendes, 389 A.2d at 787 (statutory
remedies exclusive substitute for self-help distress), overruling Snitman v. Goodman, 118 A.2d
394 (D.C. 1955) (validity of landlord's self-help recognized).
In the District of Columbia, a tenant seeking recovery of wrongfully distrained goods could
bring an action for replevin. See D.C. CODE ANN., ch. 52, §§ 1549-1562 (1925) (replevin)
(currently codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3701 to -3740 (1981)). Virtually the only basis
upon which the tenant could obtain relief was to deny default in the rent. The "defense" was
known as the plea of no rent-arrear. See, e.g., Roach v. Burgess, 4 D.C. (4 Cranch) 449 (1834);
White v. Cross, 2 D.C. (2 Cranch) 17 (1810). But see Baker v. Jeffers & Gideon, 4 D.C. (4
Cranch) 707 (1836). It is important to note the relationship between the landlord's and ten-
ant's respective remedies. Self-help distress is, by definition, extrajudicial, while the replevin
action requires the tenant whose goods have been wrongfully seized to seek the offices of the
court for relief. See D.C. CODE ANN., ch. 52, §§ 1549-1562 (1925) (currently codified at D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-3701 to -3740 (1981)).
13. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 107-08; Lesar, supra note 12, at 370.
14. See 1 A. CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.1, at 176 (1952); T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 574 (5th ed. 1956); 2 R. POWELL,
supra note 7, § 221.1, at 179.
15. See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 14, at 574 ("And so by a curious twist of history, the
freeholder was glad in the end to avail himself of remedies originally designed for the protec-
tion of the humble termor.").
16. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 373 n.15 (1973); see also T. PLUCKNET'r,
supra note 14, at 373-74 (discussion of use of de ejectione firma as a means of trying title to
land).
17. In Pernell, the Supreme Court majority noted that the use of ejectment, originally a
tenant's remedy, as a landlord's possessory device became "so widespread that a statute [4
Geo. 2, ch. 28 (1731)] was enacted to simplify its application to these cases." 416 U.S. at 373-
74 n. 16. This English statute, in force in the early history of the District of Columbia, gov-
erned landlords' possessory actions. See, e.g., Connor v. Bradley, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 211, 217
(1843).
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more frequently to the courts to sanction their activities.'" The tenant could
invoke few defenses to an action for ejectment for nonpayment of rent, aside
from denying default.' 9
From the landlord's standpoint, ejectment procedures involved time-con-
suming, expensive, and almost ritualistic formal requirements.2" New sub-
stitutes affording summary relief developed.2' These statutory summary
remedies functioned to try the right of possession between landlord and ten-
ant in a swift and expeditious matter. The early "forcible entry and de-
tainer" statutes formed the basis of the modem landlord's summary action
for possession.22
Courts achieve speed and efficiency in summary possessory actions in
part, by curtailing the defendant's procedural rights.23 Two factors particu-
18. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972); Gerwin II, supra note 10, at 643-44; see
also supra note 12 and accompanying text. Early forcible entry and detainer statutes curtailed
overzealous eviction techniques by landlords, providing criminal sanctions for excessive force.
E.g., 5 Rich. 2, ch. 7 (1381), cited in Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d at 781, 783 n.3 (D.C. 1978).
For examples of the Statutes of Richard applied in early D.C. landlord-tenant cases, see Ad-
ams v. Horr, 6 D.C. (1 Mackey) 45 (1864), and United States v. Griffin, 6 D.C. (1 Mackey) 53
(1864).
19. See supra note 12 (discussion of "no rent-arrear" cases). To the extent possible under
the unbalanced substantive law of landlord-tenant, courts invoked equitable powers to mitigate
the harshness of forfeiture in the tenant's favor. The "equity of redemption" was one example
in which the court would dismiss the action if the tenant payed rent arrearage and costs before
execution of judgment. See Gerwin II, supra note 10, at 646, 647; see also Sheets v. Selden, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 416, 421 (1868) (rule stated and applied); 4 Geo. 2, ch. 28 § 4 (1731), reprinted
in 2 ALEXANDER'S BRITISH STATUTES supra note 5, at 953, 961.
20. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 71 & n.19. See, e.g., Connor v. Bradley, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 211,
217 (1843) (listing and comparing prerequisites to ejectment at common law and under 4 Geo.
2, ch. 28.)
21. See Shipley v. Major, 44 A.2d 540,541 (D.C. 1945); see also Act of Maryland of 1793,
ch. 43 reprinted in 2 W. KILTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND (1800). This was unmistakably a land-
lord's remedy, its object, "to give a brief and summary remedy to the claimants of estates as
against possessory with an estate less than the estate of freehold." Miller v. Johnson, 6 D.C. (1
Mackey) 51 (1864).
22. The modem landlord's summary eviction remedy, like ejectment, has its roots in stat-
utory regulation of self-help. See, e.g., 8 Hen. 6, ch. 9 (1402); 21 Jac. 1, ch. 15 (1623). The
purpose of these tenant possessory remedies was "to furnish a means whereby a person who
had been forcibly put out of possession, or unlawfully and forcibly kept out, might obtain a
speedy and complete remedy, by restitution of possession . . . the remedy was statutory and
summary." Adams v. Horr, 6 D.C. (1 Mackey) 41, 42 (1864). In 1864, Congress consolidated
various common law actions into one statutory remedy to try the right of possession between
landlord and tenant which was available to the tenant in cases of wrongful forcible entry, and
to the landlord when the tenant held over after the lease had expired or was breached. Act of
July 4, 1864, ch. 243, § 2, 13 Stat. 383; see also Pemell v. Southall Realty Corp., 416 U.S. 363,
377 (1976); Harris v. Barber, 129 U.S. 366, 370 (1888). A modem statute replaced the 1864
Act in 1953, and formed the basis of the current landlord-tenant eviction statute. Act of June
18, 1953, ch. 130, 67 Stat. 66 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1501 (1981)).
23. In Lindsey, the United States Supreme Court rejected a constitutional equal protec-
19881
Catholic University Law Review
larly constrain the tenants' rights to defend and assert counterclaims based
on breaches of the lease by the landlord. First, traditional substantive land-
lord-tenant law, particularly the doctrine of independent covenants, 24 may
eliminate the issue of whether the landlord has breached obligations under
the lease from a suit for possession for nonpayment of rent. Secondly,
rules of landlord-tenant procedure preclude assertion of certain defenses and
most counterclaims.26
This combination of features creates an inhospitable litigation environ-
ment for the defendant-tenant, frequently contributing to forfeiture for non-
payment of rent.27 In recognition of the disparate legal and procedural
advantages of the landlord in comparison with the tenant, and to avoid the
anathema of forfeiture, courts traditionally exercised broad chancery powers
in the defendant's favor.21 More recently, courts have begun to inject con-
tion challenge to provisions of an Oregon statute which limited a tenant's substantive and
procedural rights in a summary possessory action. 405 U.S. at 69-74. The Court noted that
provisions for early trial and simplification of issues were closely related to the essential pur-
poses of the action: prompt and peaceful resolution of disputes over the right to possession of
real property. Id. at 70; see also, Management Partnership, Inc. v. Garris, 109 Daily Wash. L.
Rep. 789, 795 (D.C. Super. Ct. March 17, 1981) (discussion of procedural restrictions promot-
ing expeditious possessory actions in the District of Columbia), overruled sub nom. on other
grounds, Habib v. Thurston, 517 A.2d 1, 27 (D.C. 1985).
24. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Pinching v. Wurdeman, 12 F.2d 164, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (tenant's only
remedy for landlord's breach of covenant to repair is by action for damages); accord
Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187, 191-92 (D.C. 1973).
26. D.C. SCR L&T 5(b) (1987). The tenant may only counterclaim if the possessory
action is based on nonpayment of rent, rather than for nonmonetary default or holding over
past the lease term. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hawkins, 81 A.2d 467, 468 (D.C. 1951). Tenants in
nonmonetary default may assert counterclaims only if the landlord also sues for back rent as
well as possession. D.C. SCR L&T 5(b) (1987).
27. In Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court observed:
"The vast majority of suits for possession instituted in that [the landlord-tenant branch] court
result in default judgments for the landlord; in thousands of others, the tenant simply confesses
judgment." Id. at 481.
28. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. In the District of Columbia, the tenant
may avoid forfeiture at any time before judgment is executed by tendering the amount of rent
in arrears. This mitigates, to some degree, the harshness of rigid property doctrine. The
rationale for this rule is set forth in Sheets v. Selden, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 416 (1868): "[R]ent is
the object of the parties, and the forfeiture only an incident intended to secure its payment
. ...." Id. at 421; see, e.g., Molyneaux v. Town House, Inc., 195 A.2d 744, 746-47 (D.C. 1963);
Burrows Motor Co. v. Davis, 76 A.2d 163, 165 (D.C. 1950); Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v.
Service Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144, 147 (D.C. 1947); cf Frog, Inc. v. Dutch Inns of Am., 488
A.2d 925, 931 (D.C. App. 1985).
In Frog, the District of Columbia the Court of Appeals enforced forfeiture against the tenant
for allowing solicitation of prostitution, failure to pay insurance, and failure to submit certified
financial statements. The court noted that equity against forfeiture rule applies only to the
duty to pay rent and not nonmonetary defaults. Frog, Inc., 488 A.2d at 931; see also Saks v.
B.H. Steinmetz & Son Co., 293 F. 1005, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Smith v. Warren Petroleum
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tractual principles which challenge historical property assumptions to reach
an equitable result.29
B. Counterclaim, Recoupment, Set-off, and Equitable Defenses:
Landlord-Tenant Actions Under Code Pleading
In landlord-tenant procedure, strict adherence to the independent cove-
nants doctrine promotes duplicative and wasteful litigation. Under a tradi-
tional analysis, a tenant aggrieved by a landlord's breach of an express lease
covenant could bring a separate action to recover damages, but could not
defend or counterclaim on that basis because courts regarded the contractual
breach as unrelated to the landlord's right to possession.3° As long as the
tenant remained in possession, the duty to pay rent continued regardless of
the breach. In addition, at common law, rigid forms of action and repetitive
pleading rules fostered waste and delay.3 Legislatures responded to cum-
bersome anachronisms in the rules of civil procedure with a system of con-
certed reforms.3 2 The reforms sought to streamline complex common law
pleading and to avoid duplicative litigation involving identical issues.3 3 In
the District of Columbia, these procedural conveniences helped to offset the
substantive disabilities of independent covenants in landlord-tenant
procedure.
Liberal joinder of action provisions adopted in the District of Columbia
allowed various claims among parties to a civil action to be tried in one
Corp., 126 A.2d 152, 153 (D.C. 1956) (tenant denied equitable relief in action for willful
default).
29. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 n.13 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). This practice arises from acknowledgement that the essence of
the lease transaction has fundamentally changed in character. Because the essence of the
bargain is for a functional structure, the tenant's desire for a "property" interest is inseverably
integrated with, and subordinate to, expectations that the premises will meet his needs. See
Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 623-24, 517 P.2d 1168, 1180-81, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 710
(1974). The warranty of habitability in residential leases is based upon these principles, which
are derived from contract and consumer protection law. See infra notes 141-46 and accompa-
nying text.
30. Pinching v. Wurdeman, 12 F.2d 164, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
31. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D, Counterclaim, Recoupment and Set-off, § 36 (1965). At early
common law, defensive pleading was circumscribed by rigid forms of action. If the plaintiff
sued in tort, the defendant could not assert defensive claims based on breach of contract, but if
the action was in debt or assumpsit, the defendant could seek a set-off based on contractual
debt. Id.
32. See generally Blume, A Rational Theoryfor Joinder of Causes of Actions and Defenses,
andfor the Use of Counterclaims, 26 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1927). The New York Field Code was
the acknowledged vanguard of the new procedure. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 18-19 (quoting D. Field, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER ON PRACTICE
AND PLEADING 123-24 (1848)).
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proceeding, thus encouraging judicial economy.34 In addition, rules of civil
pleading recognized common law equitable defenses of recoupment and set-
off permitting use of a defendant's claims for damages to defeat the plain-
tiff's action, provided both claims arose from the same transaction. 31 Signif-
icantly, these general rules of pleading applied in District of Columbia
landlord-tenant proceedings.36
In Smith v. O'Connor, 37 a landlord's action for possession, the defendant
asserted that the lessor made fraudulent representations concerning the con-
dition of the plumbing and that the cost of repairs was $751.10 in excess of
the amount in arrears. 38 The tenant also claimed that the landlord failed to
move his goods, delaying the tenant's entry into the dwelling.39 The defend-
ant denied default and also pleaded recoupment and set-off.40
Holding denial of default a cognizable defense, the court cited a District of
Columbia Code pleading provision allowing interposition of equitable de-
fenses in all actions at law. 1 With respect to recoupment and set-off, the
court relied on rules of equitable pleading set forth in a typical mechanic's
34. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1901 to -1903 (1940), amended by D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 13-501 (1981) (mutual debts and claims under contract may be set off against one another
regardless of whether for liquidated debt or unliquidated damages for breach). Economy was
further promoted under the rubric of a code provision which dissolved the barrier between
chancery .and law, and permitted all equitable defenses to be interposed in an action at law.
See, e.g., Smith v. O'Connor, 88 F.2d 749, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Mitchell v. David, 51 A.2d
375, 379 (D.C. 1947); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-214 (1951) (superseded by D.C. Sup. CT. R. Civ.
P. 2).
35. The United States Supreme Court stated the seminal rule in 1852, in Winder v. Cald-
well, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 434, 443 (1852).
36. Various courts acknowledged the basic rule of Winder in a line of appellate landlord-
tenant opinions from 1936 to 1964. E.g., Geracy, Inc. v. Hoover, 133 F.2d 25, 27 (D.C. Cir.
1942); Smith v. O'Connor, 88 F.2d 749, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1936); George Worthington & Son
Management Corp. v. Levy, 204 A.2d 334, 335-36 (D.C. 1964); Antonelli v. Smith, 113 A.2d
570, 571-72 (D.C. 1955); Seidenberg v. Burka, 106 A.2d 499, 500 (D.C. 1954); Bellmore v.
Baum, 68 A.2d 588, 592 (D.C. 1949); Zindler v. Buchanon, 61 A.2d 616, 618 n.9 (D.C. 1948);
Mitchell v. David, 51 A.2d 375, 379 (D.C. 1947); Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617, 620 (D.C.
1946).
37. 88 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
38. Id. at 750.
39. Id. Notably, the court found the representations of the landlord as to the condition of
the plumbing to abrogate the traditional rule of caveat lessee, cf Lawler v. Capital City Life
Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1933), despite the fact that both the tenant and her agent
had inspected the premises. Smith, 88 F.2d at 751.
40. Smith, 88 F.2d at 750.
41. Id. at 751; see also Mitchell v. David, 51 A.2d 375, 379 (D.C. 1947). Current rules of
landlord-tenant pleading reflect these equitable powers of the Landlord-Tenant Division, al-
lowing the tenant to assert claims "for equitable relief related to the premises" in defense to a
landlord's action for nonpayment of rent, or when a claim for rent in arrears accompanies an
action for possession. D.C. SCR L&T 5(b) (1987).
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lien contract case.4 2 Under these rules, a defendant could plead unliqui-
dated tort damages for the repairs arising from the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion claim as a recoupment.43 The claim that the landlord failed to deliver
possession to the tenant by the stipulated day represented a contractual
breach of covenant count, and a proper subject for a set-off."
Following Smith, the District of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals
recognized the tenant's right to plead defensively a variety of claims against
the landlord in a suit for nonpayment of rent.4 5 The court construed these
rights broadly. At this point, it appeared that the rules, despite their salu-
42. Smith, 88 F.2d at 751 (citing Winder v. Caldwell, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 434, 443-44
(1852)). Smith's significance includes its application of procedural rules developed in a purely
contractual context, growing out of exchanges of goods and services, to the summary posses-
sory remedy. In setting forth the defensive pleading rule, supra note 35, the court also cited
Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630 (1887), a case arising out of the sale of racing mares. 88
F.2d at 752.
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
44. Smith, 88 F.2d at 752. Despite its framing of the defensive issues in contractual terms,
Smith may not be characterized as a complete procedural abrogation of the substantive disabil-
ities of independent covenants. The court appears to have followed the English rule with re-
spect to delivery of possession. Under this view, delivery of possession by the landlord was one
of the few covenants upon which the tenant's duty to pay rent was dependant. See generally
Gerwin, A Study of the Evolution and Potential of Landlord-Tenant Law and Judicial Dispute
Settlement Mechanism in the District of Columbia-Pt. 1: The Substantive Law and the Nature
of the Private Relationship, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 457, 475 n.80 (1977) [hereinafter Gerwin I].
The covenant of quiet enjoyment represents another example of a covenant upon which the
tenant's duty to pay rent depends. The covenant, which may be expressly set forth in the lease,
see e.g., Rittenberg v. Donahoe Constr. Co., 426 A.2d 338, 342 (D.C. 1981), assures the tenant
a right to possession undisturbed by acts of the landlord or those claiming rights through him.
See R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3.3, at 94-95 (1980).
The landlord may breach the covenant by actually evicting the tenant without right, id. at 95-
97 (actual eviction), or by so interfering with the tenant's right to possession that the tenant is
forced to abandon the premises (constructive eviction). See Hughes v. Westchester Develop-
ment Corp., 77 F.2d 550, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Rittenberg, 426 A.2d at 342. The limitations
on defensive pleading described in this Comment, outgrowths of the independent covenants
doctrine, generally do not apply to the eviction defenses, which arise from breaches of depen-
dent covenants.
45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. A clearer departure from the harsh results
demanded by traditional property principles appears in cases immediately following Smith. In
Geracy, Inc. v. Hoover, 133 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1942), the circuit court held a plea of recoup-
ment for the landlord's negligent damage to chattels on the leased premises to be within the
jurisdiction of the court, despite the fact that the counterdemand exceeded the jurisdictional
limit of the municipal court. Id. at 27.
In Mitchell v. David, 51 A.2d 375 (D.C. 1947), the municipal court of appeals remanded a
landlord's action for possession and back rent in which the trial court struck certain counter-
claims based on the landlord's failure to repair. The court, relying on Smith, ordered a new
trial on whether the landlord's covenant to repair existed, and whether it had been breached.
Id. at 376, 379. Perhaps most importantly, the court accepted the defendant's argument that
the landlord's failure to make repairs as required by the lease constituted a cognizable equita-
ble defense. Id. at 378-79; cf Pinching v. Wurdeman, 12 F.2d 164, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
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tary policy objective of efficiency and economy, had the incidental effect of
expanding the defendant-tenant's ability to complicate an action for eviction.
Judges perceived liberal pleading as a force undermining the simple and
summary character of landlord-tenant proceedings. 46
In 1946, the municipal court promulgated a new rule covering pleading
and motions in landlord-tenant proceedings.47 In deference to the summary
nature of the possessory action, rule 4(c) barred counterclaims and recoup-
ment, except when the landlord claimed possession based on nonpayment of
rent.4' The new rule barred such pleas in actions for possession for holding
over past the lease term, and for nonmonetary defaults under the lease.49
The court further amended rule 4(c) to expressly limit the amount of a
defensive set-off in a possessory action based on nonpayment of rent to the
amount of rent claimed in arrears.50 The change more clearly effectuated
the rule's equitable principle: to allow the tenant to defeat the landlord's
claim that rent was due, and not to provide the tenant with a forum for
46. See Rubenstein v. Swagart, 72 A.2d 690, 691-92 (D.C. 1950). By 1946, defendant
tenants had developed a standard practice of entering pleas in abatement and demanding jury
trials, which led to a large backlog of cases. Id. at 691-92 n.4.
47. See 74 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 1214, 1215 (Dec. 20, 1946). Pursuant to its authority to
prescribe rules of procedure for its branches, D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-722 (1940) (currently
codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1727 (1981)), the municipal court, effective January 6, 1947,
adopted LANDLORD AND TENANT RULE 4. 74 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 1214-15. Rule 4(c)
abolished the plea in abatement, and limited recoupment and counterclaim rights to actions for
nonpayment of rent:
(c) In suits of this Branch for recovery of possession of property, no counterclaim,
cross claim, or claim by way of recoupment shall be set up therein, except where the
basis of recovery of possession is non-payment of rent, but the exclusion of prosecution
of said claims in this Branch shall be without prejudice to the prosecution of said
claims in other Branches of the Court.
74 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 1215 (emphasis added).
48. Compare Bellmore v. Baum, 68 A.2d 588, 591-92 (D.C. 1949) (tenant's counterclaims
denied under rule 4(c) against claim for possession based on unlawful entry) with Johnson v.
Hawkins, 81 A.2d 467, 468 (D.C. 1951) (rule 4(c) counterclaim may be entertained only when
suit for possession is based on nonpayment of rent).
49. 74 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 1215. Logically, nonmonetary defaults fall outside the
scope of recoupment, set-off, and counterclaim rules. These rules allowed a tenant's unliqui-
dated claim for tort or contract damages arising from the landlord's breach of the lease to be
asserted as a counterdemand against the landlord's claim that rent was owed, thus defeating
forfeiture of the lease. Rent was considered to be a liquidated debt as of the day it fell due. See
Crowder v. Lackey, 46 A.2d 699, 700 (D.C. 1946).
50. As of 1966, rule 4(c) provided:
Rule 4. Verification, pleading and motions. (c) In suits in this branch for recovery of
possession of property in which the basis of recovery of possession is nonpayment of
rent, tenants may set up an equitable defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-
off in an amount equal to the rent claim. No counterclaim may be filed unless the
plaintiff asks for money judgment for rent.
8 D.C. CODE ENCYCLOPEDIA, GENERAL SESSIONS COURT RULES, § II rule 4 (1967).
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pressing affirmative claims."' However, if the landlord sued for back rent as
well as possession, the tenant could counterclaim for a sum in excess of the
rent claimed due.5 2
In Seidenburg v. Burka,53 the municipal court of appeals confronted the
substantive implications of rule 4(c)'s approach to defensive pleading. A
tenant of commercial property defended a landlord's suit for possession by
claiming that the landlord owed him a sum for roof repair expenditures
which exceeded the amount of rent in arrears."4 The court held that the
tenant carried its burden in establishing a breach of covenant and found the
breach an appropriate subject of a set-off, but granted the landlord judgment
for possession because the tenant failed to prove, with adequate certainty,
the cost of repairs incurred. 5
Significantly, the claimed set-off related to a breach of the covenant to
repair, which the courts historically regarded as independent of the duty to
pay rent.5 6 Moreover, the rule cited by the court recognized that the tenant
could plead total or partial failure of consideration as a set-off when the
landlord sued for possession for nonpayment of rent to avoid circuity of ac-
tion. 7 This rule represents the pinnacle of liberal landlord-tenant pleading.
The procedural approach reflected in the cases following Smith implied that
a tenant aggrieved by a landlord's breach of a lease covenant now had alter-
natives in pursuing his claim. The tenant could either initiate a suit, or de-
feat the landlord's action for possession by asserting the breach
defensively.5 8
II. THE JA VINS REVOLUTION: THE ASCENDANCY OF CONTRACT IN
RESIDENTIAL LEASES
In 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit revolutionized substantive law governing leases of residential hous-
51. Id. at 224-25 (commentary describing rule and associated case law).
52. See Zindler v. Buchanon, 61 A.2d 616, 618 (D.C. 1948) (when landlord sues only for
possession, and does not ask for money judgment for rent, equitable defense or claim by way of
recoupment is the limit of the tenant's remedy).
53. 106 A.2d 499 (D.C. 1954).
54. Id. at 499.
55. Id. at 500.
56. Cf Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Pinching
v. Wurdeman, 12 F. 164, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
57. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 658, at 635 (1982). ("When the courts speak of
'failure of consideration'. . . [t]hey mean that a promisor has not received something for which
he bargained; and they give that as a reason why his promise should not be enforced").
58. See Geracy, Inc. v. Hoover, 133 F.2d 25, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Antonelli v. Smith,
113 A.2d 570, 571-72 (D.C. 1955); Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617, 619-20 (D.C. 1946).
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ing units. In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,59 the court abrogated
traditional property law doctrine, which allowed forfeiture of a lease for
nonpayment of rent regardless of the condition of the leased premises.6"
The appellant tenants asserted numerous housing code violations as an
equitable defense, by way of recoupment or set-off, in order to defeat the
landlord's claim that rent was due, invoking rule 4(c).6" The Javins court
observed that modem leases represent predominantly a series of contractual
exchanges,62 and that a warranty of habitability, independent of any express
lease covenants, should be implied into residential leases and measured by
standards set forth in the housing code.63 Not only did the court imply a
covenant to repair, but it constructively conditioned the tenant's duty to
payment upon the landlord's performance of that covenant. 64
The warranty of habitability changed the character of proceedings in land-
lord-tenant court. It incorporated into the summary possessory action an-
other fundamental issue: whether the premises complied with housing code
provisions during the period for which the landlord claimed unpaid rent.
The new substantive rights resulted in procedural complications.65 In light
59. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
60. Id. at 1074-75.
61. Id. at 1073. The landlord-tenant judge below rebuffed these defenses without ade-
quately stating his reasons. Id. at 1073 n.4. It is interesting to note that rule 4(c) was the
procedural vehicle for recognition that leases for modem urban dwellings should be governed
by the substantive law of contract. Id. at 1073 n.3.
62. Id. at 1074. The historical justification for the shift from property to contract is sum-
marized in the comment accompanying the Purposes and Rules of Construction, Uniform
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, which indicates that property "doctrines are inappropriate
to modem urban conditions and inexpressive of the vital interests of the parties and the public
which the law must protect." Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act § 1.102 comment, 78
U.L.A. 434 (1985).
63. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1080.
64. Id. at 1082.
65. See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The substan-
tive right of the tenant to withhold rent in the event the landlord breaches the duty to maintain
the premises in accordance with housing code standards is a powerful self-help remedy exer-
cised without judicial supervision, essentially at the tenant's discretion. The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals was apprehensive of sanctioning any departure from the housing
code as an identifiable standard measuring the right to withhold. See Winchester Management
Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187, 191-92 (D.C. 1976); see also 2 R. POWELL, supra note 7,
§ 260.2(2), at 17-Al0 to -All.
Moreover, the existence of habitability defenses resulted in procedural delays. See Javins,
428 F.2d at 1082 & n.62 (tenant must be given opportunity to prove housing code violations);
Brown v. Southall Realty Corp., 237 A.2d 834, 837 (D.C. 1970) (lease void ab initio if housing
code violations exist at time lease is entered); see also Bell, 430 F.2d at 481-82. In addition, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized a seventh amendment right to a jury trial in
proceedings brought under the District's summary eviction statute. Pernell v. Southall Realty,
416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974).
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of a staggering landlord-tenant case volume, 66 courts began to view the hab-
itability defenses as a threat to the simplicity and speed of summary posses-
sory actions.
III. PROCEDURAL IMPACT OF HOUSING CODE DEFENSES: THE
GENESIS OF THE RESIDENTIAL/COMMERCIAL DISTINCTION
A. Preserving the Landlord's Right to Derive Income from the Leased
Premises: Development of the Protective Order
In direct acknowledgment of the landlord's loss of income during the pen-
dency of litigation when the tenant interposed warranty of habitability de-
fenses, the court adopted a device whereby a tenant invoking such defenses
was required to pay the rent as it fell due during the suit into the registry of
the court.67 In Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co.,68 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered the effects of new
defenses on the landlord's ability to derive income from his property. The
trial judge ordered the tenant to pay rent as it fell due into the registry of the
court.69 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit recognized a prepayment requirement in civil litigation as
an extraordinary measure, but noted that the assertion of housing code viola-
tions as defenses had the effect of denying the landlord the benefit of the
summary proceeding.7°
To ensure that judges accounted for the interests of the tenant, the court
declined to set forth a strict rule requiring protective order payments in all
cases.7 It found a protective order appropriate only when the defendant
demanded a jury trial, or asserted housing code violation defenses, and only
after motion by the landlord, notice to the tenant, and opportunity for argu-
66. Gerwin II, supra note 10, at 753. In 1976, six years after Javins, 114,408 cases were
filed in Landlord-Tenant court, id. at 752, of which 19,491 received the attention of a judge,
resulting in an average daily landlord-tenant docket of 77 cases. Id. at 753.
67. The "protective order" blossomed from a suggestion in a footnote in Javins, 428 F.2d
at 1083 n.67, into an institutional fixture of landlord-tenant procedure. "The issuance of a
protective order requiring a tenant to pay an amount equal to the agreed upon monthly rent,
or sometimes a lesser amount, into the registry of the court has become the norm rather than
the exception in the landlord-tenant branch." Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d
1085, 1086 (D.C. 1981); see also 2 R. POWELL, supra note 7 260.2(2), 17-AI0 to -All.
68. 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
69. Id. at 479.
70. Id. at 479, 481. The court observed that in most civil litigation, the plaintiff has no
advance assurance of the defendant's solvency when commencing litigation. Id. The court's
perception of the protective order's inevitable constrictive effect on a tenant's ability to proceed
in forma pauperis further heightened this concern. Id.
71. Id. at 482.
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ment by both parties.72 In upholding the trial court's order, the court called
for a careful weighing of the respective interests of landlord and tenant.73
The court concluded that, in certain limited circumstances, the landlord-
tenant court could draw on its equitable powers and require protective order
payments to avoid placing the landlord at a disadvantage during the
litigation.74
In McNeal v. Habib, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recog-
nized the tenant's right to a hearing on the issue of the final disbursement of
proceeds held by the court in escrow. The tenant asserted retaliatory evic-
tion and housing code violations in defense to a suit for possession and de-
manded a jury trial.76 The court granted the landlord's motion for a
protective order. Shortly before trial, the tenant removed herself from the
premises. She sought either return of the protective order money or an evi-
dentiary hearing to determine if the court should withhold and return to her
a portion of the landlord's payment due to housing code violations which
existed prior to her surrender of the premises.77 Instead, the trial court or-
dered the entire sum to the landlord.78
The court of appeals reversed, holding that due process requirements enti-
tled the tenant to proffer evidence as to the extent to which the protective
order should be abated for housing code violations prior to disbursement to
the landlord. 79 The court further noted that, in proper circumstances, a
hearing on whether the landlord's motion for a protective order should be
granted is also appropriate, 0 thus introducing two distinct potential strata
of delay into final disposition of the action.
The court in Habib v. Thurston"' resolved a critical question regarding
rights to trial in a McNeal hearing. It concluded that the tenant had a sev-
enth amendment right to a jury trial on the issue of disbursement of funds
deposited into court, even when the tenant demanded no jury trial in the
72. Id. at 483.
73. Id. at 484-85.
74. Id. at 482. While due process does not require a full-fledged evidentiary hearing on
the issue of whether a motion for a protective order should be granted, the court may hear
argument and take limited evidence if appropriate. See McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 513-
14 (D.C. 1973); see also Dameron v. Capitol House Assocs., 431 A.2d 580, 583 (D.C. 1981).
75. 346 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1973).
76. Id. at 510.
77. Id. at 510-11.
78. Id. at 511.
79. Id. at 514.
80. Id. at 514 & nn.12, 13.
81. 517 A.2d I (D.C. 1985).
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underlying possessory action.8 2 The court accepted the tenant's view of the
protective order hearing as "a separate and distinct equitable proceeding, not
part of the underlying possessory action.",8 3 Thus, it found a full evidentiary
trial before a jury adjudicating the rights between the parties to the money in
escrow an available predicate to final disbursement of the funds."4
McNeal & Habib v. Thurston introduced hearing rights to protect the ten-
ant. These procedures stemmed from the District of Columbia Circuit
Court's rather grudging sanction of the protective order device in Bell. 85
The requirement that the tenant place the rent in escrow when a protracted
trial is likely, however, has become more the rule than the exception the Bell
court envisioned.86 Originally adopted as a device to offset the effects of
procedural delay,87 the protective order, and the availablity of hearings asso-
ciated with it, developed into a potentially virulent source of delay and com-
plexity in its own right.
Dameron v. Capitol House Associates Ltd. 88 represents an attempt to re-
store the original function of the protective order. This case suggests that
the judge, in proper circumstances, may order rent escrowed during the pen-
dency of the suit paid directly to the landlord. In Dameron, the court of
appeals upheld a carefully drawn protective order which allowed the judge
to release a portion of the protective order payment to the landlord on a
monthly basis during the suit.89 The court held that it lies within the trial
court's discretion as to whether it must hold the full amount of the monthly
rent in its registry as a protective order, in view of the preliminary showing
of de minimus housing code violations in the case.9° The decision indicates
that if the trial judge at the early pre-trial stage determined that the plead-
ings and oral argument on the landlord's protective order motion failed to
place a certain portion of the protective order payment in legitimate dispute,
the court could release such amount directly to the landlord during the
suit.91
82. Id. at 24-26. Contra Management Partnership, Inc. v. Garris, 109 Daily Wash. L.
Rep. 789, 793-94 (D.C. Super. Ct. March 17, 1981).
83. Thurston, 517 A.2d at 17 (quoting Smith v. Interstate General Corp., 462 A.2d 1133,
1134 (D.C. 1983)).
84. Id.
85. Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
86. See Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d 1085, 1086 (D.C. 1981).
87. Bell, 430 F.2d at 482.
88. 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981).
89. Id. at 582.
90. Id. at 584-85.
91. See Bunn, Commercial Landlord/Tenant Eviction: A D.C. Guide, WASH. LAW.,
Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 35, 36.
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B. Reaction to the Contractual Revolution: Resurrection of Independent
Covenants: The Commercial/Residential Distinction
Shortly after the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit decided Javins, District of Columbia courts underwent reor-
ganization.92 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals assumed
jurisdiction as the appellate court of last resort.93 No longer subject to re-
versal by the United States circuit court, the court of appeals declined to give
full scope to the Javins court's perspective of the urban lease as a contract.
94
Instead of carrying the contractual revolution forward, the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals revitalized the discredited independent covenants
doctrine and embarked on a course of constricting the tenants' ability to
plead defenses.
This reaction began with a refusal to apply a contractual construction to
commercial leases. Three years after Javins, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals made it absolutely clear that the breach of covenants by a land-
lord would not bar enforcement of forfeiture of a commercial lease. In Inter-
state Restaurants, Inc. v. Halsa," the landlord sought possession based on
the tenant's default under a lease provision requiring that the leased restau-
rant remain open on weekends.96 The trial court refused to admit evidence
proffered by the tenant showing that the landlord had breached its obliga-
tions to maintain and repair the premises; it found such evidence unrelated
to the breach asserted by the landlord.97 On appeal, the tenant argued that
Javins represented a rule of construction requiring that courts treat leases
like any other contract. According to this argument, the court should not
enforce forfeiture of a contract unless the party seeking it had strictly per-
formed his obligations.98
The court of appeals, relying on the rule that courts in landlord-tenant
disputes generally consider covenants in leases independent, rejected the ar-
gument. 99 The Javins defenses, the court observed, arose from the unique
92. See District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, § I11,
title I, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-102 (1981)).
93. Id.; see also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 367 (1973).
94. Gerwin I, supra note 44, at 462 n. 18.
95. 309 A.2d 108 (D.C. 1973).
96. Id. at 109. Although the suit for possession was based on nonmonetary default, it
would be less than accurate to say that the dispute was unrelated to the rent. As is typical in
commercial leases, part of the rent was calculated on the basis of the business' gross sales. Id
97. Id. at 109 n.l.
98. Id. at 110.
99. Id. It is interesting to note that the court, in its citations of authorities supporting the
independent covenants proposition, failed to refer to a single case decided in the District of
Columbia.
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nature of residential urban housing and its associated problems.I °° The
court reasoned that, because housing code violations did not apply in com-
mercial settings, the implied warranty of habitability did not apply. The
court found it significant that tenants in commercial leases generally retained
counsel to negotiate on their behalf.'0° Thus, the court denied commercial
tenants any substantive defenses based on Javins policy analysis.
For the commercial tenant, Halsa revitalized the substantive force of in-
dependent covenants and caveat lessee doctrines challenged by the court in
Javins. The court distinguished construction of lease covenants based upon
the nature of the property as residential or nonresidential. It thus found one
means of containing the impact of the warranty of habitability defenses.
However, judicial reaction to the new defenses went far beyond distinctions
in substantive analysis, and soon changed long-established procedural rules
governing defensive pleading, even in residential leasehold disputes. Six
years after Javins, the court of appeals adopted a myopic view of the tenants'
rights to plead defenses, a sharp break from the expansiveness of prior case
law.
Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, o2 marked the beginning of this
departure. The case arose when twenty-four tenants of the Winchester-Un-
derwood apartment building, organized and acting in concert, sent reduced
rent checks to the landlord after negotiations failed to result in improved
maintenance. 0 3 The landlord refused the tender, and possessory actions en-
sued. At trial, the tenants asserted that they went without hot water and air
conditioning for sixty-nine days in the summer of 1973. °" The trial court
judge, adopting the approach set forth in Smith 's calculated reductions in
rent attributable to the landlord's breaches, and instructed the tenants to pay
100. Id. at 110-11.
101. Id. at 110.
102. 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976). The Winchester court construed Landlord and Tenant rule
5(b), the successor to rule 4(c). Id. at 191 n.13. Rule 5(b) now states:
Counterclaims In actions in this Branch for recovery of possession of property in
which the basis of recovery is nonpayment of rent or in which there is joined a claim
for recovery of rent in arrears, the defendant may assert an equitable defense of re-
coupment or set-off or a counterclaim for a money judgment based on payment of
rent or on expenditures claimed as credits against the rent or for equitable relief
related to the premises. No other counterclaims, whether based on personal injury or
otherwise, may be filed in this Branch. This exclusion shall be without prejudice to
the prosecution of such claims in other branches of the Court.
D.C. SCR L&T 5(b) (1987).
103. Winchester, 361 A.2d at 188.
104. Id. at 188-89.
105. Id. The trial judge's actions clearly followed the code pleading model set forth in the
Smith line of cases. See supra notes 35, 36, 57, 58, and accompanying text.
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
only the balance, or they would forfeit their leases."16 The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals reversed in part holding that, because absence of
air conditioning did not amount to a per se housing code violation, the land-
lord's breach of an express covenant to provide this service did not constitute
a proper subject for the equitable defenses of recoupment and set-off.'0 7 The
court held the tenants liable for the entire amount of back rent. The court
conditioned a tenant's long-established procedural right to plead breaches of
covenant upon the existence of significant housing code violations, which
gave rise to a substantive right to withhold rent.' The court's power to
determine the amount of back rent to afford the tenant the equity against
forfeiture did not give rise to "expanded authority to adjudicate all conflict-
ing claims between the landlord and tenant."'1 9
Judge Fickling dissented, eulogizing the abandoned expansive ap-
proach." o He noted that the majority's conclusion ignored both the plain
language of rule 5(b) governing equitable defenses and counterclaims, and
established case law in the District of Columbia."' He decried the major-
ity's failure to cite any authority whatsoever indicating that it should predi-
cate the right to plead equitable set-off and recoupment defenses upon either
payment of rent or the existence of housing code violations." 2 Judge
Fickling found the requirement that the tenants file an independent action in
another branch of the court unjustified, and a repudiation of the policies
formerly evinced in rules of pleading in landlord-tenant court."13 .
In Winchester, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals measured the
mutuality of the contractual obligations in a lease to extend only as far as the
provisions of the housing code.' Winchester thus brought defensive land-
lord-tenant pleading full circle by returning to the ancient view that breaches
of covenant not dependent upon the duty to pay rent were essentially irrele-
106. Winchester, 361 A.2d at 188.
107. Id. at 190. Commentators have recognized this holding as a retreat from Javins' lib-
eral trend and a resurrection of the doctrine of independent covenants. See Gerwin I, supra
note 44, at 491-93. Another commentator has also noted that it represents a break from prior
case law allowing recoupment or set-off in the event of the landlord's breach of covenant. J.
KARPOFF, supra note 4, at 88.
108. Winchester, 361 A.2d at 192 n. 13. The majority reasoned: "In the unique context of a
landlord's summary suit for possession, a defense premised upon a failure of the landlord to
perform other obligations is inappropriate [and] ... irrelevant, for a tenant is not entitled to
withhold rent based on any other asserted breach of contract." Id.
109. Id.; see also Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf supra notes 19,
28, and accompanying text (discussion of "equity against forfeiture").
110. Winchester, 361 A.2d at 193 (Fickling, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 193-94 (Fickling, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 194 (Fickling, J., dissenting).
113. Id. (Fickling, J., dissenting); see also J. KARPOFF, supra note 4, at 34-35.
114. See supra note 108.
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vant in a landlord's possessory action.' Although decided in the context of
a residential lease, Winchester's narrow approach to defensive pleading effec-
tively foreclosed equitable defenses formerly available to commercial ten-
ants. Because commercial properties are not covered by the housing code,
these tenants enjoy no substantive rights to withhold rent. Thus, Winchester
effectively denies procedural rights recognized under the Smith line of cases
to nonresidential tenants in a landlord's action for nonpayment of rent.' 16
In addition, this result and analytical approach lacks consistency in compar-
ison with those of Javins, which demands that contractual aspects of the
modem urban lease, not discredited property fiction, govern modem urban
landlord-tenant relations.'
The majority's active restriction of tenants' procedural rights may be ex-
plained in light of two factors. First, Javins endowed residential tenants
with a substantive right to withhold rent, which the court of appeals had
perceived as tipping the scales too far in their favor." 8 Second, by 1976, the
sheer volume of cases before the landlord-tenant division had grown to such
staggering proportions that any procedural complications compromised the
ability of the court to expeditiously manage its docket." 9
In Campos v. Aguila, 2o the court of appeals confronted a glaring conflict
between the broad language of landlord and tenant rule 5(b) and the court's
narrow approach favoring swift and summary disposition of commercial
lease disputes without procedural complications. The dispute between land-
lord and tenant arose from the lease of a building and the sale of the grocery
business located therein.' 2'
The tenant alleged that she made a cash payment to the landlord, which
the court later found to be a partial payment for the grocery business. She
argued that such payment could be asserted defensively under rule 5(b) as a
115. Winchester's resurrection of independent covenants cannot be easily reconciled with
Javins' emphasis on contractual principles. Gerwin I, supra note 44, at 492-95. In answer to
Justice Fickling's criticism of the court's departure from established rules of landlord-tenant
pleading, the majority explained that, while the old emphasis on avoidance of multiple actions
was laudable, "an equally valid and well-recognized objective is the prompt settlement of
possessory disputes. We decline to further defeat the summary nature of a possessory action
by sanctioning the resolution therein of additional claims which the tenant might seek to inter-
pose." Winchester, 361 A.2d at 192 n.14.
116. See Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617, 620 (D.C. 1946) (liberal recoupment and set-off
rule recognized in case involving commercial property); accord Seidenberg v. Burka, 106 A.2d
499, 500 (D.C. 1954) (commercial tenant's set-off claim for expenses incurred in repairing roof
held cognizable in landlord's suit for possession).
117. See supra note 115.
118. See supra note 65.
119. See McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 511 (D.C. 1975).
120. 464 A.2d 132 (D.C. 1983).
121. Id. at 132.
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credit against the rent "related to the premises. '  The trial court granted
the landlord's motion in limine, refusing to allow the tenant to plead the
payment defensively. The court of appeals agreed, holding that rule 5(b)'s
reference to equitable defenses related to the premises applied only to pay-
ment of the rent or expenditures claimed as credits against the rent.1 23 "De-
spite the fact that both agreements arose from the same set of dealings, the
Campos court found that the amount tendered was not payment of rent, and
therefore, the defensive claim was outside the jurisdiction of the landlord-
tenant court. 1 2 4 The court construed the primary function of the rule as
expeditious resolution of landlord-tenant disputes.1 25
Millman Broder & Curtis v. Antonelli 12 6 placed the court's current empha-
sis on the commercial landlord's interest in swift and uncomplicated recov-
ery of leased property, in derogation of tenant's procedural rights, in sharp
focus. In an action for possession and back rent, the commercial tenant at-
tempted to assert the landlord's breach of a promise to locate a subtenant as
a rule 5(b) defense. 127 The tenant claimed that liability for rent due would
have been reduced or extinguished if the management agent had performed
as promised. The court of appeals referred to the unique status of commer-
cial leases in holding that, despite the broad language of rule 5(b), a counter-
claim "related to the premises" referred exclusively to claims based on a
payment or credit against the rent in the context of a commercial tenancy. 
128
While Halsa clearly established that the Javins implied warranty defenses,
or defenses based upon its broad policy underpinnings, are not available to
commercial tenants,1 29 Campos and Millman essentially left open the ques-
tion as to whether expenses directly incurred by the tenant as a result of the
landlord's failure to perform under an express lease covenant could be
pleaded as either "rent credits" or as a claim for "equitable relief related to
122. Id. at 132-33; see also supra note 102.
123. Campos, 464 A.2d at 133.
124. Id. The references in rule 5(b) to recoupment or set-off defenses "based on payments
of rent or credits against the rent," and "equitable defenses related the premises" are disjunc-
tive, connected with the word "or." See D.C. SCR L&T Rule 5(b) (1987); supra note 2. Nev-
ertheless, the Campos court held that only payments of rent or credits against the rent qualified
as an "equitable defense related to the premises" for the commercial tenant, thus merging two
separate bases for defenses into one. See 464 A.2d at 133.
125. Campos, 464 A.2d at 132. Former emphasis on avoidance of multiplicity of action
over issues arising from the same transactional core was clearly subordinated to swift and
simple recovery of the landlord's property. Cf supra text accompanying notes 34-36, 58.
126. 489 A.2d 481 (D.C. 1985).
127. Id. at 484.
128. Id.
129. Interstate Restaurants Inc. v. Halsa, 309 A.2d 108, 110-11 (D.C. 1973), discussed in
supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text; see also E.P. Hinkel & Co. v. Manhattan Co., 506
F.2d 201, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the premises" under 5(b). 3° However, reading the cases together, and in
light of the court's special treatment of nonresidential leases, the commercial
tenant suffering damages due to the landlord's breach of covenant must
either negotiate for a rent credit acknowledged by the landlord or pay the
rent and any expenses flowing from the landlord's breach in order to pre-
serve procedural rights to defend on that basis in a landlord's eviction
action.
IV. ANALYSIS: BRINGING COMMERCIAL LEASES INTO
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The court currently links the tenant's procedural right to defensively
plead landlord's breaches under rule 5(b) to a substantive right to withhold
rent due to housing code violations. 31 A commercial tenant is placed at a
severe disadvantage in a landlord's summary action for nonpayment of
rent. ' 32 Prior to the advent of the housing code violation defenses, a distinc-
tion between the nature of the tenancy as either residential or nonresidential
made little difference in pleading defenses.' 33 There was no requirement
that the tenant have a substantive right to withhold rent in order to defen-
sively assert recoupment, set-off, or counterclaim against the landlord's
breaches.'34 Case law focused on avoiding separate trials over two claims
between the same parties arising out of a dispute involving the lease
instrument. 35
Currently, housing code violations are virtually the only trigger of a right
to plead landlord's breaches of lease covenants defensively. However, hous-
ing code violations do not apply to commercial leases. Thus, even the most
egregious failure to perform express lease covenants by the landlord may not
form the basis of a cognizable defense by a commercial tenant. 36 In a typi-
cal dispute, the commercial landlord enjoys the full benefit of summary re-
130. The agreement at issue in Millman was entered some three years after the lease. 489
A.2d at 484. The court indicated that the fact that the alleged promise by the landlord was not
contemporaneous with the lease, and that the landlord disputed responsibility under such
agreement led to complexities which would unduly hamper expeditious resolution in landlord-
tenant court. Id. It was unclear whether the exclusion of the counterclaim was based on
insufficient transactional identity between the lease and the agreement, as in Campos, or the
independent covenant doctrine set forth in Winchester, although strong undercurrents of both
theories run through the opinion. Id.
131. See Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187, 191 & n.13 (D.C. 1976);
see also supra text accompanying note 108.
132. See, e.g., Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 9, at 860 n.31.
133. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
135. See Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617, 620 (D.C. 1946).
136, See, e.g., Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 9, at 860 n.31.
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covery of leased property for the tenant's breaches, while the tenant must
await resolution of his claim in the severely overburdened civil division in
order to obtain redress for the landlord's wrongdoing. 137
The court of appeals has clearly limited the scope of defensive pleading in
commercial tenancy to claims arising from rent payments or acknowledged
rent credits.' 38 Two key rationalizations justify this anomaly. First, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals tenaciously clings to obsolete notions
of caveat lessee and independent covenants in explaining the residential/
commercial distinction. 139 Second, restrictions on defenses may be founded
in the court's unwillingness to further delay and complicate the summary
nature of the proceeding in the tenant's favor."4
A. The Case for the Contractual Approach to Commercial Leases
Any decision rooted in the "traditional special character of landlord-ten-
ant law""'' in justifying a distinction between residential and nonresidential
leases essentially has its foundation in fiction. Javins rested its departure
from property doctrine upon three premises. First, the nature of the lease
bargain changed with the transformation of an agrarian society into an ur-
ban one.'4 2 Rather than an estate in property, the modem tenant bargains
for "a well known package of goods and services," including heat, light,
ventilation, and proper sanitation and maintenance.'43 Second, the tenant is
generally ill-equipped to effect repairs himself, and relies on the diligence
and honesty of the landlord to ensure that the premises may be used for their
intended purpose, a precept extracted from consumer protection law.'"
Third, the typical residential lease transaction involves gross inequality of
bargaining power between landlord and tenant, making the lease a virtual
adhesion contract.' 45 The features of a modem urban residential lease indi-
cate that the essence of the bargain is an exchange of contractual promises,
rather than conveyance of a property interest.
137. See Swesnik & Blum v. DePandi, 108 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2089, 2095 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Sept. 4, 1980).
138. Millman Broder & Curtis v. Antonelli, 489 A.2d 481, 484 (D.C. 1985); Campos v.
Aguila, 464 A.2d 132, 133 (D.C. 1983); Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d
187, 192 (D.C. 1976).
139. Interstate Restaurants, Inc. v. Halsa, 309 A.2d 108, 110 (D.C. 1973); Swesnik &
Blum, 108 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2095.
140. Winchester, 361 A.2d at 192 n.14.
141. Swesnik & Blum, 108 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2095.
142. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75, 1077 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
143. Id. at 1074.
144. Id. at 1075-77, 1078-79.
145. Id. at 1079-80.
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The nature of the bargain involved in a lease of urban commercial prop-
erty has changed apace with that of the lease for housing.'46 Without a
doubt, a modem lease of office or retail space involves a more complex and
detailed exchange of promises intended to address a broader range of "goods
and services" than a residential lease, and most of these covenants are con-
tractual in nature.'47 Thus, the first Javins premise applies with equal force
in leases of office or retail space.148 Further, it is noteworthy that Javins
adopted principles derived from Uniform Commercial Code warranties of
fitness for purpose.149 This bolsters the argument that an implied warranty
of fitness for purpose, measured by the mutual expectations of the parties
memorialized in the lease document, should be read into modem commer-
cial leases. Significantly, the Uniform Commercial Code is primarily
designed to protect commercial relations, and the warranty of fitness
manifests the commercial buyer's reasonable expectations and reliance upon
the seller's.honesty and diligence.' 5°
146. Cf id. at 1074-75. The view of a lease as primarily a conveyance of an interest in
property "may continue to be reasonable in some leases involving farming or commercial land.
In these cases, the value of the lease to the tenant is the land itself." Id. at 1074. Clearly, the
modem lease of office or retail space does not fall into this category.
147. The reluctance of the courts to extend the contractual perspective of the leasehold
relationship to nonresidential tenants is not limited to the District of Columbia and has gener-
ated a great deal of critical scholarly commentary. See generally Greenfield & Margolies,
supra note 9; Levinson & Silver, Do Commercial Property Tenants Possess a Warranty of Habit-
ability,? 14 REAL ESTATE L.J. 59 (1985); Comment, Landlord-Tenant: The Medieval Concepts
of Property are Alive and Well in Leases of Commercial Property in Illinois, 10 J. MARSHALL J.
PRAC. & PROC. 338 (1977) (now published as JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW); Comment,
Commercial Leases: Behind the Green Door, 12 PAC. L.J. 1067 (1981) [hereinafter Comment,
Behind the Green Door]; Comment, Commercial v. Residential Leases: A New Double Stan-
dard?, 35 PIr. L. REV. 901 (1974); Comment, Modernizing Commercial Lease Law: The
Case for an Implied Warranty of Fitness, 19 SUFF. L. REV. 929 (1985) [hereinafter Comment,
Modernizing Commercial Lease Law]; Note, Landlord-Tenant-Should a Warranty of Fitness
Be Implied in Commercial Leases?, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 91 (1981).
148. See Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 9, at 877 (commercial office leases ripe for
reform); accord Comment, Modernizing Commercial Lease Law, supra note 147, at 949-50.
149. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075. For a discussion of cases in other jurisdictions where "war-
ranties of fitness" have been implied in commercial leases, see Comment, Modernizing Com-
mercial Lease Law, supra note 147, at 945-49 & n. 106 (analyzing seminal case Reste Realty
Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969) and other cases); see also Kratovil, The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the UCC: A Real Property Law Perspective, 16 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 287, 289-90 (1983) (noting reliance on Uniform Commercial Code analogy in
recent retreat from caveat lessee in residential leases); Comment, Behind the Green Door, supra
note 147, at 1085-91.
150. Cf D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-315 (1981). Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
implies a warranty of fitness in the sale of goods for the protection of buyers who rely on the
superior skill and expertise of the seller. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315
(1972). This policy rationale is particularly appropriate in commercial relations between lessor
and lessee. See, e.g., All States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177, 1182 (1975);
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The landlord and commercial tenant do not always stand in equal bar-
gaining positions. Market forces could conceivably place certain business
tenants in the same disadvantageous position to which Javins alluded. 1 51
While no shortage in the general commercial rental market currently exists,
desirable rental property may be priced beyond the reach of a small business
entering the market. If limited resources combine with an unsophisticated
commercial tenant, the potential for abuse of bargaining power by the land-
lord cannot be denied. Finally, Javins reflected a judicial desire to combat
urban blight by ensuring a minimum standard of performance on the part of
the residential landlord. While safe and habitable housing is essential to re-
vitalization of an urban core in decline, another immediate measure of eco-
nomic recovery is the strength of small, neighborhood business ventures.
Commercial landlords who fail to adhere to their lease obligations to small
business tenants should not be permitted to enforce a forfeiture under terms
any more favorable than those which restrain their residential counterparts.
In sum, the nature of a commercial lease in the District of Columbia is
surely as alien to medieval England as a residential lease. No feature of the
commercial lease justifies the court's refusal to emphasize its contractual as-
pects as compared to a residential lease.
B. Complication and Delay in Summary Possessory Actions
In Winchester, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals made passing
reference to the abandoned policy of avoiding circuity of action by indicating
that its relative value was outweighed by a need to "draw the line" on delays
and complications in summary possessory actions. 15 2 The court, however,
continues to foster delays in final resolution of the rights and obligations of
parties to the lease. Most of these procedural delays are directly attributable
to the warranty of habitability defenses. While commercial tenants as a class
have keenly felt compensatory limitations on defensive pleading, the sub-
stantive defenses which foster delays are not available to them. Thus, com-
see also Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 9, at 880-85. The office or retail tenant reasonably
expects that the commercial landlord, engaged in the business of managing and leasing prop-
erty, will provide the services required under the lease.
151. Comment, Modernizing Commercial Lease Law, supra note 147, at 952. The State of
New York has adopted a statutory provision in the New York Real Property Law equivalent
to the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, allowing the court to "blue pencil" (reform or
rescind) commercial leases which, in part or whole, appear to have been unconscionable when
made. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235(c) (McKinney Supp. 1988); Kuklin, The Changing
Law of Commercial Leases, 9 REAL ESTATE L.J. 163, 165-67 (1980); cf. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28:2-302 (1981).
152. See Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187, 192 n.14. (D.C. 1976); see
also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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mercial tenants do not contribute to the problem for which they are
penalized.
In addition to the delays and expense associated with trying the merits of
housing code violation defenses, several other related factors may seriously
undercut the landlord-tenant division's ability to swiftly and efficiently dis-
pose of possessory actions in the manner envisioned by the court of appeals.
First, the United States Supreme Court has upheld a tenant's right to a jury
trial in the summary possessory action in the District of Columbia.
1 53
Although most lease forms include a waiver of this right, the Landlord-Ten-
ant procedural rules provide a mechanism by which a party with cognizable
defenses may have the case certified for a jury trial in the civil division on an
expedited basis. 154  Second, the protective order procedure, originally
designed to offset the effects of procedural delay caused by the housing code
defenses, introduces further complexity, which may delay final resolution of
claims between landlord and tenant.15 5
Bell, McNeal, Thurston, and Dameron address the intricate implications
of landlord-tenant protective orders. Although these cases grew in the first
instance from the innovation of residential housing code defenses, 15 6 entry of
protective orders has become more the rule than the exception contemplated
in Bell, and the court routinely imposes them in commercial landlord-tenant
disputes.' 57
If future courts construe Dameron as authorizing disbursement of the
amount of a protective order determined not to be a potential subject for an
153. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 376 (1974).
154. D.C. SCR L&T 6 (1987). Rule 6 requires the tenant to submit a statement of facts
underlying a defense before the case is certified to the civil branch for an expedited trial.
155. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. The protective order introduces two
discrete strata of delay and issue proliferation into final resolution of landlord-tenant disputes.
First, the judge may take limited evidence on whether a protective order is justified, and its
amount. See McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 512 n.8, 513-14 (D.C. 1973) (in appropriate
cases, the interests of justice may call for a hearing on a motion for a protective order); id. at
514 n.12 (court may conclude that some testimony would be of assistance in setting the
amount of the protective order). Second, the tenant is entitled to a hearing on the disburse-
ment of rental funds held in escrow. Id. at 514 n. 15. The tenant is entitled to a jury trial on
this issue. Habib v. Thurston, 517 A.2d 1, 24 (D.C. 1985).
156. See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (discussed supra
notes 68-74 and accompanying text); Habib v. Thurston, 517 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1985) (discussed
supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text); Dameron v. Capitol House Associates Ltd., 431
A.2d 580, 584 (D.C. 1981) (discussed supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text); McNeal v.
Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 510-11 (D.C. 1973) (discussed supra at notes 75-80 and accompanying
text).
157. E.g., City Wide Learning v. William C. Smith & Co., 488 A.2d 1310, 1312 (D.C.
1985); Davis v. Gulf Oil Corp., 485 A.2d 160, 172 & n.14 (D.C. 1984); see also Mahdi v.
Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d 1085, 1086 (D.C. 1981) (protective orders have become
the norm).
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abatement on the basis of housing code violations,' 58 no obstacle to requir-
ing the commercial tenant to pay the rent as it falls due directly to the land-
lord during the suit would remain.159 In a suit for nonpayment of rent, the
tenant, pursuant to Dameron, must make a preliminary showing that a valid
set-off claim exists. Because, under current rules of pleading, commercial
tenants may not invoke defenses based on housing code violations or
breaches of fitness for purpose, this presents a virtually impossible burden to
meet for such a tenant. If the courts accept this view of Dameron, the disa-
bilities placed on a commercial tenant will be compounded considerably.
C. Restoring Fairness and Economy to Commercial
Landlord-Tenant Procedure
To restore equity and economy to commercial landlord-tenant procedure,
it would not be necessary to read into commercial leases implied warranties
of fitness for purpose or any other Javins analog.' 6" The linkage of a sub-
stantive right to withhold rent to a procedural right to plead defensively
recoupment or set-off for landlord's breaches is a judicial innovation that
unfairly disadvantages commercial tenants.' 6 ' If the lease imposes specific
duties "'62 on the landlord, there is no principled reason for refusing to allow
breaches of those duties to be pleaded defensively in the landlord's suit for
possession for nonpayment of rent. A small business lease may represent the
tenant's sole means of livelihood. As a matter of equity, the court should
not permit the landlord to enforce forfeiture of the lease if he has not per-
formed his obligations in good faith.'63 When both the landlord and tenant
158. In Dameron, the court utilized its discretionary powers to set a landlord's protective
order at an amount less than the rent due. 431 A.2d at 584. Because a fixed amount less than
the monthly rent was in dispute, the court found that refusing to release the balance to the
landlord during the pendency of the suit would afford the tenant "an economic weapon of
unreasonable proportion." Id. at 585.
159. Bunn, supra note 91, at 40.
160. A strong argument, however, for so doing may be made. See supra notes 146-51 and
accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 116, 131-33, and accompanying text; see also Pinching v. Wurdeman,
12 F. 164, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (separate action in another branch sole remedy for tenant
aggrieved by landlord's breach); Swesnik & Blum v. DePandi, 108 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2089,
2095 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1980).
162. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Property originally imposed a duty on the
landlord of both residential and commercial property to maintain the premises in a manner
"suitable for the use contemplated by the parties." Comment, Behind the Green Door, supra
note 147, at 1090-91; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Landlord and Tenant
§ 5.1 (1976) (reporter's note at 174, 176). The reporter's notes expressed the opinion that this
rule should be extended to nonresidential property. Id. The small commercial tenant is in
particular need of attention. Id.
163. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
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are in breach, the court should not allow the landlord to use truncated land-
lord-tenant proceedings to disadvantage the tenant and force settlement or
forfeiture.
The modem commercial tenant contracts for more than the bare right of
possession. Typically, landlord and tenant exchange a detailed series of con-
tractual promises memorialized in a lease. With its ability to limit issues and
evidence, the landlord-tenant division is ideally suited to resolve disputes
arising between landlord and tenant under this instrument in an expedited
manner that benefits both parties."6 When the landlord has breached ex-
press lease covenants, the tenant should not be forced to forfeit the business
and pursue a delayed remedy in another division of the court.
If the court remains steadfast in its insistence that the tenant pursue
breach claims in civil division, continuance of the landlord's possessory ac-
tion pending final resolution of the parties' rights and obligations under the
lease presents an expedient and just alternative to immediate judgment for
the landlord. Once the tenant made a preliminary showing that a bona fide
defense based on breach of express lease covenants existed, the court could
stay the possessory action, or at minimum, judgment for possession, pending
final judgment on the defendant-tenant's breach of contract claim. If suc-
cessful in civil division, the tenant should then be able to apply damages
recovered, if any, on his breach of covenant claim against the rent claimed
due to avoid forfeiture of the lease. This would give the landlord an incen-
tive to negotiate a settlement in more balanced proportion to that of the
tenant's under current conditions. It would also ensure that both parties
enjoy vindication of their respective rights on roughly the same schedule.
Perhaps a more level battleground would limit the current distinct advan-
tage to a race to the courthouse for the landlord, thus helping in some mea-
sure to alleviate case management difficulties in landlord-tenant division. It
would certainly ensure that only landlords who came before the court with
clean hands could avail themselves of the benefits of summary recovery of
rental property.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the development of substan-
tive and procedural reforms in favor of the residential tenant have resulted in
significant erosion of the swift and simple nature of summary actions for
164. Both parties should equally benefit from the advantages of summary justice, as well as
to bear the burdens imposed by procedural rules designed to ensure expeditious disposition.
The landlord-tenant branch has considerable latitude to limit issues and evidence in proceed-
ings within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., D.C. SCR L&T 1, 3, 6, 10.
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possession. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has reacted by de-
clining to give full scope to a contractual perspective of the leasehold rela-
tionship and adopting a restrictive view of permissible defensive
counterdemands not based on housing code violations. This perspective rep-
resents a retreat from an earlier expansive approach to defensive pleading in
landlord-tenant matters. Although nonresidential tenants have suffered pro-
cedural disabilities resulting from this narrow view, this class of tenants has
not benefitted from the substantive rights extended to residential
counterparts.
The practical consequences of the current situation are significant. In up-
holding the tenant's right to a jury trial on warranty of habitability issues in
summary landlord-tenant proceedings, the United States Supreme Court in
Pernell v. Southall Realty indicated that landlord-tenant courts should not
serve as "rubber stamps" for landlords seeking to evict tenants, but to pro-
vide both parties with a fair opportunity to present their cases.1 65
Yet disparate treatment of commercial tenants has precisely that effect.
The inescapable threat of summary dispossession weighed against the pros-
pect of slow and expensive civil litigation necessarily affects the distribution
of bargaining power in lease negotiations as well as landlord-tenant litigation
tactics. The reservation of the tenant's right to pursue claims for breach of
covenant by the landlord in civil division is no answer to the dilemma. The
tenant's ability to bring a separate action may indeed ensure swift and sum-
mary disposition of the landlord's claim for possession within the landlord-
tenant division, but it surely promotes further litigation within the sorely
overburdened superior court system, while exposing the tenant to forfeiture
of the lease in the meantime.
Benjamin J. Lambiotte
165. Pernell v. First Nat'l Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 385 (1973). The Pernell Court also dis-
counted the District of Columbia Court of Appeals trepidation over recognizing a tenant's
right to a jury trial on a counterclaim based on housing code violations, finding it "doubtful"
that such rights would impair expeditious resolution of landlord-tenant disputes. See id. at
383-85. Commercial landlord-tenant disputes could also be resolved on an expedited basis
under the specialized rules of procedure applicable in the landlord-tenant branch. See supra
note 164 and accompanying text. The interests of the landlord could be secured through the
protective order device, using the procedures set forth in McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 512
(D.C. 1975). See Dameron v. Capitol House Assocs., 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981); see also supra
notes 75-80, 88-91.
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